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INTRODUCTION
The often conflicting relationship between state and local
regulation of the environment presents a difficult question for North
Carolina as the state explores one of the energy industry's most
controversial practices: hydraulic fracturing.' This question is whether
and to what extent local governments should have the authority to
regulate hydraulic fracturing when the state has enacted a regulatory
scheme promoting its use. It is a question rife with political elements
relating to the structure of American democracy, but it is one that has
often been resolved legally by judges in our nation's courtrooms.
* © 2014 Bryan M. Weynand.
1. See James L. Joyce, North Carolina Oil and Gas Update, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 413, 413-14 (2013) (noting that North Carolina is "not traditionally" an oil and gas
state, but recent research regarding the state's shale gas deposits and recent changes in
North Carolina law may "make North Carolina a viable destination for shale gas
development").
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Moreover, it leaves opponents of hydraulic fracturing in an ironic
position: if they continue to favor consolidated federal power over
environmental policy, they also become passionate defenders of local
government control.! In an apparent effort to settle the issue, the
North Carolina General Assembly acted in the summer of 2014 to
preempt most options for local regulation of hydraulic fracturing.3
This Comment contends that the General Assembly succeeded in
striking the correct balance, but in a few isolated regards it may have
deprived localities of reasonable authority. The larger question of
whether and to what extent North Carolina (and its subdivisions,
cities and counties) should allow hydraulic fracturing rightfully
remains exclusively with the state government, and the state expressly
preempts local attempts to restrict the practice. However, local
governments may have lost some power to act in areas that have
traditionally fallen within their expertise, even as applied to hydraulic
fracturing; these powers, such as zoning ordinances and setback
requirements, have been utilized effectively according to a balance
struck in other, more gas-rich states, most notably in Pennsylvania.
Analysis proceeds in six parts: Part I provides a brief policy
overview of hydraulic fracturing, focusing on its development in
North Carolina; Part II examines how the question of state and local
governance has played out in two resource-rich states, Pennsylvania
and Colorado, exploring the legal analysis utilized to draw lessons
from the results; Part III addresses the law of local governance in
North Carolina, specifically the lack of home rule authority and the
law of preemption;4 Part IV overviews developments in the law of oil
and gas regulation in North Carolina, including the most recent steps
taken by the North Carolina General Assembly to advance hydraulic
fracturing; Part V analyzes how local government regulation of
2. See, e.g., Adam Garmezy, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing's Environmental and
Economic Impacts: The Need for a Comprehensive Federal Baseline and the Provision of
Local Rights, 23 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 405, 432-33 (2013) (presenting the
traditional arguments in favor of strong federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing while
preserving the ability of local governments to effectively ban hydraulic fracturing, despite
state regulation and promotion).
3. Energy Modernization Act, ch. 4, § 14, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws , (to be codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1).
4. North Carolina is one of only a few states in the nation that lack home rule
authority in either their constitution or statutes; instead, counties and incorporated
municipalities in North Carolina depend exclusively on statutory grants of power from the
state to act. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. As this Comment discusses
later, this puts North Carolina's local governments at a significant, initial legal
disadvantage relative to localities in other states that have experienced success regulating
hydraulic fracturing. See infra Part III.
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hydraulic fracturing might fare in a legal challenge; and finally, Part
VI briefly comments on the way forward for North Carolina under
the new law, comparing the law to the balance struck by
Pennsylvania, which mostly preempts local authority while preserving
discrete, traditionally local powers.
I. OVERVIEW OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. National Perspective
Although the focus of this Comment is on the legal and policy
concerns governing the balance between state and local control-and
not on the debate over whether and to what extent North Carolina
should frack-a brief background is helpful. This Part will describe
the technical process of hydraulic fracturing, briefly discuss the
controversial environmental concerns associated with it, and
summarize the effect of hydraulic fracturing on the national energy
economy.
Hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as "fracking," is a
specialized form of drilling used to extract oil and gas deposits that
are difficult to reach.6 Fluid, a mix of mostly water with sand and
chemical solvents, is injected into the subsurface in order to fracture
the shale in which the deposit is found; these fractures allow for
increased flow of the oil or gas, obtaining access to low permeability
geological formations.' The process involves injecting the fluid at high
pressure down a vertical oil or gas well; however, the fractures
created by the injection can extend hundreds or thousands of feet
horizontally away from the well.' The additives to the fluid operate to
hold open the fractures and allow horizontal flow of oil or gas.' Some
of the fluid remains underground in the formation, while some
returns to the surface as "flowback" and is typically disposed of
5. See, e.g., Sean Cockerham, New Forecast Finds U.S. Flush with Energy,
MCCLATCHYDC (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/12/16/211835/new-
forecast-finds-us-flush-with.html; Editorial, Reports Show Need for Caution on NC
Hydraulic Fracturing, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2013),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/12/19/3473446/reports-show-need-for-caution.html.
6. See The Process of Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(Aug. 11, 2014), http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing/process-hydraulic-fracturing
(providing a brief but informative technical description of hydraulic fracturing).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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underground or treated for recycling."o Through this process, the
increased flow of oil or gas allows extraction of previously
inaccessible reserves."
Though it is popularly assumed to be a new technology due to its
recently expanded economic potential-and controversial
reputation-hydraulic fracturing has been used in the United States
since the 1940s.12 In the late 1990s and 2000s, however, technological
advancements utilizing hydraulic fracturing in conjunction with
horizontal drilling techniques dramatically expanded access to
previously inaccessible domestic natural gas resources.' This
development in turn offered the potential for an increased role for
unconventional drilling, and particularly for natural gas, in supplying
America's energy needs.14 Heightened political concern regarding
both environmental protection and dependence on foreign energy
launched a national policy conversation, pitting proponents of natural
gas as the key to achieving American energy independence against
those skeptical of hydraulic fracturing's impact on the nation's water
supply and of the long-term production of a fossil fuel.'
The dispute over the future of natural gas production remains
largely unresolved. The Energy Information Administration estimates
that the United States possesses approximately 334 trillion cubic feet
of recoverable natural gas."' Estimates vary, however, because this
number is subject to increase as technological advances expand what
is technically recoverable; in fact, the number has risen each year
since 2008." The extent to which natural gas offers a path to
American energy independence is often misrepresented, and the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach
that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913, 919 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Natural Gas Summary: U.S., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng-sum_1sum-dcu-nusa.htm; see also Julia Bell, EIA: Surge
in Shale Development Redefines America's Energy Outlook, ENERGY IN DEPTH (Dec. 17,
2013, 8:08 AM), http://energyindepth.org/national/eia-suige-shale-development-redefines-
americas-energy-outlook/ ("The advances in hydraulic fracturing ... have enabled a
renaissance in domestic energy development, and additional innovation will drive
continued growth in oil and natural gas production from tight formations.").
15. For an overview of the commonly raised environmental objections to hydraulic
fracturing, including those related to both water pollution and carbon emissions, see
Garmezy, supra note 2, at 414-23. Garmezy also provides an overview of the potential
economic benefits. See id. at 424-27.
16. Natural Gas Summary: U.S., supra note 14.
17. Id.
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purported benefits of such independence remain unclear.'" It is clear,
though, that if current projections hold, natural gas will occupy a
prominent place in the future of our energy consumption: projections
predict that it will continue to be a vital resource for industrial
consumption and residential heating, as well as a viable, cleaner, and
less carbon-dioxide-intensive alternative to coal.' 9 States such as
Pennsylvania that possess vast natural gas resources have already
experienced a significant increase in energy production.2 0
Meanwhile, attempts to resolve related environmental concerns
remain largely inconclusive. The primary concern focuses on water
contamination, but other potential issues include the use of large
quantities of water, greenhouse gas emissions, and seismic
disturbance." Generally, the results of such attempts show that while
popular characterizations of hydraulic fracturing risks are frequently
and dramatically overblown, some concerns do remain. These
concerns, however, are difficult to ascertain, and the particular risk
levels vary significantly in different geographic regions depending on
the geology of that region.22
At the federal level, hydraulic fracturing is subject to several of
the broad, existing regulatory schemes promulgated under the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act, which are typically implemented at the
state level subject to approval from the Environmental Protection
Agency.2 3 However, a variety of exemptions from other federal
18. See Matthew Hulbert, Ten Reasons to be Concerned About U.S. Energy
Independence, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewhulbert/2012/11/12/ten-reasons-to-be-concerned-about-u-s-energy-independence/
(providing a succinct statement of the main arguments surrounding this complex policy
discussion); see also Simon Lester, The Goal Should Be Energy Interdependence, CATO
INST. (2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/goal-should-be-energy-
interdependence (arguing that energy independence should not be a policy goal and that
international interdependence makes us better off).
19. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 6, 9 (Aug.
2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo-full.pdf.
20. William J. Sutherland et al., Horizon Scan of Global Conservation Issues for 2011,
26 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 10, 14 (2011) (noting that 1,386 natural gas wells
were drilled in Pennsylvania in 2010 and projecting 3,500 by 2020).
21. Garmezy, supra note 2, at 414-23.
22. Id.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012) (providing for state implementation plans to achieve
national water quality standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (providing for similar state
implementation plans to achieve national ambient air quality standards). To the extent
that hydraulic fracturing activity impacts a state's ability to achieve these federal
standards, the state implementation plans must account for this impact in their regulatory
schemes. However, especially regarding the federal water quality standards, there is some
doubt as to whether effective federal oversight is possible; judicial interpretation of the
scope of the federal government's jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act (defined by
600 [Vol. 93
FRACKING AND LOCAL PREEMPTION
regulatory programs, such as regulations governing disposal of
hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"), leave the most significant regulation of hydraulic
fracturing to the states.24 States with major shale gas resources, such
as Pennsylvania and Colorado, extensively regulate oil and gas
drilling through their respective oil and gas acts and the issuance of
regulatory permits.25 In response to the economic and environmental
developments discussed above, these states attempted to adjust their
environmental regulatory schemes to accommodate the new
prevalence of hydraulic fracturing operations, both to address
environmental concerns and to provide regulatory certainty to a
budding and promising new industry.26 The most notable example of
this trend was Pennsylvania's comprehensive revision to its Oil and
Gas Act in 2012.27 Faced with a multitude of municipal attempts at
regulating hydraulic fracturing, the Pennsylvania state legislature
acted to clarify and strongly reinforce language limiting municipal
authority to regulate more stringently than the state.28 These
provisions are examined in more detail below, and thus far
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted them to strike a balance
preserving some traditional local authority. 29
statute as "navigable waters") has sharply limited its ability to regulate waters, such as
those involved in hydraulic fracturing, that are not connected to permanent, navigable
bodies of water. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732-34 (2006) (applying 33
U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) to limit the federal government's jurisdiction to continuously present,
fixed bodies of water); see also Powers, supra note 12, at 940-41 (providing a more
thorough discussion of the challenge posed by the Rapanos decision to federal regulation
of hydraulic fracturing).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (exempting drilling fluids associated with the
production of oil and natural gas from RCRA); see also Garmezy, supra note 2, at 410-12
(providing a brief overview of federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing); Powers, supra
note 12, at 938-39 (describing the development of other exemptions for hydraulic
fracturing from broader regulatory programs).
25. See Francis Gradijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 7
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 47,63-79 (2012).
26. See generally JACQUELYN PLESS, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATES TAKE THE LEAD ON REGULATING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING:
OVERVIEW OF 2012 STATE LEGISLATION (2013), available at http://www.ncsi.org/
documents/energy/NaturalGasDevLeg3l3.pdf (providing a description of national trends
in state legislatures and a chart detailing the extensive state legislative activity in 2011 and
2012).
27. H.B. 1950, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) (codified at 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-3504 (West 2012)).
28. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3301-09.
29. See infra Part II.A.
2015] 601
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. Developments in North Carolina
As new as this policy debate is on a national scale, it is especially
new to North Carolina. Surveys have shown inconsistent results as to
how much recoverable natural gas exists, leading to inconsistent
projections regarding when and if hydraulic fracturing will become
profitable in the state.30
These inconsistent and unclear projections have not prevented
substantial movement by the state and by private actors to bring
hydraulic fracturing to North Carolina. Over 9,000 acres of property
have been leased for mineral extraction in south central North
Carolina, where most of the reserves lie underneath the Deep River
Basin, centered on Lee County.' The General Assembly has also
taken significant steps to ensure the state's regulatory scheme is in
place. Both hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling were illegal in
North Carolina until the General Assembly lifted the bans in its 2012
bill, the Clean Energy and Economic Security Act.32 The bill
reconstituted the North Carolina Mining and Energy Commission
and directed it to develop most of the substantive rules that will
govern hydraulic fracturing in the state.33 A 2014 act of the General
Assembly clarifies the question of local and state governance by
expressly preempting most local regulation, preserving only a limited
local authority to seek state approval for traditional land-use and
zoning regulations as applied to hydraulic fracturing.34
Though considerable local activism has contributed to the
budding controversy over hydraulic fracturing in North Carolina, few
30. Compare ROBERT C. MILICI ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND
GAS RESOURCES OF THE EAST COAST MESOZOIC BASINS OF THE PIEDMONT, BLUE
RIDGE THRUST BELT, ATLANTIC COASTAL PLAIN, AND NEW ENGLAND PROVINCES,
2011: U.S.G.S. Fact Sheet 2012-3075 (2012), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov
/fs/2012/3075/fs2012-3075.pdf (providing estimates of oil and gas reserves along the east
coast), with Statement on Release of U.S. Geological Survey Assessment of North Carolina
Oil and Gas Resources, N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCES (June 6, 2012),
http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/opalshale-gas-news-releases/-/asset-publisher/Uj51/content/
statement-on-release-of-u-s-geological-survey-assessment-of-north-carolina-oil-and-gas-
resources?redirect=%2Fweb%C2Fopa%%C2%AEshale-gas-news-releases (commenting
on the U.S.G.S. fact sheet results).
31. N.C. DEP'T OF ENV'T & NATURAL RES. & N.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NORTH
CAROLINA OIL AND GAS STUDY UNDER SESSION LAW 2011-276, at 32 (2012), available
at http://portal.ncdenr.org/c/documentlibrary/get-file?uuid=9a3b1ccl-484f-4265-877e-
4ael2af0f765&groupld=14.
32. Clean Energy and Economic Security Act, Ch. 143,2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 658.
33. Id. § 1(b), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 660-63 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-
293.1 to 293 .6 (2014)).
34. Energy Modernization Act, ch. 4, § 14, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (to be codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1 (2014)).
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local governments have taken binding action, and those actions that
have been taken are invalid and acknowledged as symbolic." This
may be partly the consequence of local governments' uncertainty-
and pessimism-regarding the extent of their regulatory authority.
For example, Raleigh, the state's capital and second-largest city, and
Creedmoor, a nearby town of approximately 4,000 people, have
enacted symbolic ordinances banning hydraulic fracturing within their
city limits. 6 A host of other cities and counties have passed
resolutions expressing varying degrees of opposition to hydraulic
fracturing within their respective limits or within North Carolina
generally." A later section of this Comment focuses on whether the
state has provided clear guidance to localities hoping to regulate
fracturing and what options remain for localities to do so. 38
II. SIMILAR CONFLICTS IN MORE RESOURCE-RICH STATES
States possessing more economically viable natural gas resources
have a more developed body of law on the question of local and state
governance. Localities in Pennsylvania and Colorado have had
surprising success in litigation, despite existing case law that, while
ambiguous, would appear to advantage the state. This Part analyzes
how courts in these states have handled this question. The results
offer a useful comparison to the circumstances in North Carolina
because the legal analysis and policy questions, though distinct in
critical ways, broadly resemble each other.
A. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania, sitting above the Marcellus Shale, possesses one of
the largest natural gas reserves in the United States." Parts of the
state have experienced significant economic revitalization due to
hydraulic fracturing, and the state government has actively promoted
hydraulic fracturing through legislation.' The number of localities
35. See, e.g., Chapel Hill Council, Residents Take Anti-Fracking Stance, WRAL.CoM
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/10909469/.
36. Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH,
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/hydraulicfracturinghydraulicfracturing-action-
center/local-action-documents/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015) (providing a comprehensive list
of local bans and resolutions against hydraulic fracturing nationally).
37. Id.
38. See infra Part V.A.
39. See Natural Gas Summary: U.S., supra note 14 (quantifying the natural gas
reserves in each U.S. state).
40. See H.B. 1950, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) (codified at 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2301-3504 (West 2012)); supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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attempting to ban or limit hydraulic fracturing, however, made
Pennsylvania one of the first states to test whether and how localities
could do so. Appellate rulings on several cases have provided
guidance on two essentially distinct questions related to local control:
first, whether state law preempts local attempts to regulate hydraulic
fracturing; and second, whether forceful attempts by the state to
explicitly and completely preempt localities can survive state
constitutional scrutiny.
1. Home Rule and Preemption
Pennsylvania is a home rule state, meaning that local
governments possess a broad delegation of governing authority and
do not require a specific statutory delegation to act on a particular
issue.4 ' In Pennsylvania, a legislative scheme located across several
state statutes preempts local authority on oil and gas drilling, while
preserving roles that are traditionally local in nature.42 Notably, this
legislative intent was recognized and enforced by the state's highest
court in two high-profile appellate cases decided on the same day in
2009.43
The state's Oil and Gas Act supersedes any local action
"purporting to regulate oil and gas operations," except those
regulations authorized under the Municipal Planning Code and the
Flood Plain Management Act." Yet even these authorizing
exceptions are significantly limited by the Oil and Gas Act, which
prohibits local regulation of the "same features" of oil and gas
operations regulated by the state or regulations that "accomplish the
same purposes" as the Oil and Gas Act.45
41. See Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at
Home Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 282-83 (2013) (describing Pennsylvania's law of home
rule as it relates to oil and gas drilling).
42. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10603 (West 2012) (containing Pennsylvania's
Municipal Planning Code's authorization for local zoning ordinances related to oil and gas
drilling); 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3301-09 (West 2012) (containing components of the
Oil and Gas Act governing preemption of local authority, including the 2012 revisions);
see also W. Devin Wagstaff, Fractured Pennsylvania: An Analysis of Hydraulic Fracturing,
Municipal Ordinances, and the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. 327,
336 (2013) (providing a description and analysis of the powers of local governments in
Pennsylvania to regulate hydraulic fracturing, including analysis of recent case law and the
2012 revisions).
43. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa.
2009); Range Res.-Appalachia v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa. 2009).
44. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302 (West 2012).
45. Id.
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In two cases, challenges to local ordinances tested the allocation
of authority under these laws. In Huntley & Huntley v. Borough
Council of Oakmont,' the court rejected a preemption challenge to a
municipal zoning ordinance restricting drilling to certain zoning
districts and providing setback requirements designed to protect local
private property and the surrounding environment.4 7 More generally,
the ordinance was also politically designed to discourage drilling in
Oakmont.4 The court held that a well site's location and setback
requirements were not actually a part of the oil and gas "operations"
regulated at the state level.49 Rather, the zoning ordinances served a
distinct purpose from the state regulations: local land organization
and development, and not the promotion (or from Oakmont's
perspective, discouragement) of oil and gas drilling and protection of
the environment.50
In the second case, Range Resources-Appalachia v. Salem
Township," the court struck down a local ordinance that directly
regulated several aspects of drilling operations.52 The court held that
the ordinance regulated the same features of oil and gas drilling
regulated by the state, and did so for the same purpose. In
subsequent cases in both federal and state courts, courts have upheld
exercises of zoning authority under Pennsylvania law, while all other
attempts to regulate hydraulic fracturing have been struck down.54
The Huntley court's express rationale-that the local ordinance
serves the purpose of land organization and does not regulate drilling
operations-hides some tacit overlap of Oakmont's regulatory
purpose with that of the state. That is, the town's action was
motivated in part by local concerns regarding environmental
protection, a stated purpose of the state Oil and Gas Act." Under a
more strict preemption analysis, this overlap in purpose would have
led to a different outcome because the regulation aims to "accomplish
46. 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009).
47. Id. at 866.
48. See Wagstaff, supra note 42, at 338.
49. 964 A.2d at 865-66.
50. See id. at 864.
51. 964 A.2d 869 (Pa. 2009).
52. Id. at 871.
53. Id. at 877.
54. See Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 733 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
(upholding a requirement that companies obtain special zoning permit); see also Range
Res.-Appalachia v. Blaine Twp., 2009 WL 3515845, at *3, *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009)
(striking down a local ordinance prohibiting any company from drilling for natural gas if it
had three or more violations of any state law, even if unrelated).
55. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202 (West 2012).
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the same purpose[]" as the state, which has already considered
environmental protection among a range of factors in determining
how to regulate oil and gas drilling.5 6 Therefore the court's attempt to
distinguish the two cases on the basis of regulatory purpose strains to
survive closer scrutiny.
But a more fundamental structural concern-preserving
traditional local authority-may be driving the court's compromise in
upholding the local ordinance in Huntley, and it paves a path that can
guide the creation of a compromise in other states. In actuality,
Huntley and Range Resources-Appalachia are distinguished not by
the intent of the towns involved, but instead by the nature and extent
of the local powers exercised." Rather than deprive localities of
almost all significant authority on the matter, the Huntley court
identifies the physical site location of oil and gas production (and
other industrial activity) as a traditionally local decision that will
remain within the authority of a locality." This case suggests that this
local authority will exist even if exercised with intent to limit or
discourage drilling within its borders. By contrast, apparently,
exercises of authority with this same intent that are not traditionally
local in nature will be deemed preempted by the state scheme. Thus,
in these two cases the court conveyed, if not articulated, a useful
precedential dividing line to evade the difficult preemption inquiry:
localities may impact oil and gas drilling, provided that their focus
remains on addressing their goals through traditionally local
functions, such as zoning.
2. Constitutional Scrutiny of Preemptive Legislation
Independent of this case law, another recent case, Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth," declared the strengthened preemption
provision of Pennsylvania's Oil and Gas Act void under the state
constitution.' In 2012, the state legislature, in an attempt to further
quash the authority of local governments to regulate hydraulic
fracturing, strengthened the Oil and Gas Act's preemption
56. Id. § 3302.
57. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 857
(Pa. 2009); Range Res. -Appalachia, 964 A.2d at 871. In both cases, the towns sought to
contravene the state's policy promoting hydraulic fracturing and thus exposed themselves
to a preemption challenge but only in Huntley did the town confine its efforts to
traditionally local functions.
58. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 864-66.
59. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
60. Id. at 981-82 (invalidating 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b) (West 2012)).
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language.' The amended Act established fixed setback distances that
could not be increased by localities,62 a limitation directly aimed at
one of the zoning powers upheld in Huntley & Huntley." Most
controversially, the revision required localities to authorize drilling as
a permitted use in all zoning districts, including residential districts,
albeit subject to certain protective restrictions.' As with the setback
provision, this provision also deprived localities of a power upheld by
the court under the previous version of the Act.s These revisions
allowed for little remaining ambiguity in a preemption analysis, as the
state law now prohibits the only means by which localities could
traditionally limit the locations where hydraulic fracturing occurred.
While the court split as to the basis for the ruling striking down
the revisions, the plurality based its holding on an environmental
conservation provision in the state constitution, similar to such a
provision in the North Carolina Constitution.6  The Pennsylvania
provision declares that the state's citizens possess "a right to clean air,
pure water, and to the preservation ... of the environment," further
mandating that the state "shall conserve and maintain [these
resources] for the benefit of all the people."67 In the plurality's view,
by enacting the statutory setback requirements and the mandated
zoning authorizations, the legislature "failed to properly discharge
[its] duties as trustee of the public natural resources."6 1
As in Huntley and Range Resources-Appalachia, a prevailing
theme of the court's analysis was the impingement on traditionally
local government functions, although in Robinson, the constitutional
basis for this analysis was the environmental trustee duty.69 The court
noted that forcibly permitting oil and gas drilling in all zoning
districts, including residential districts, renders the state incapable of
adequately conserving the environment.7 0 Moreover, the court
61. H.B. 1950, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 3301-09 (Pa. 2011) (codified at 58
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3301-09 (West 2012)).
62. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b) (West 2012)).
63. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
64. § 3304(b).
65. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 864 (Pa.
2009); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
66. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 977 (Pa. 2013). Compare PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27 (declaring that "public natural resources are the common property of
all the people"), with N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5 (declaring the policy of the state "to
conserve and protect its lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry").
67. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
68. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 979.
2015] 607
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
criticized the statutory setback provision's allowance of waivers as
arbitrary and insufficiently protective of the environment."
At the more complex levels, however, the argument becomes less
clear. The court immediately followed its discussion of the
environmental trust provision with a thorough discussion of property
owner expectations and reliance regarding government action.72 The
radically altered zoning scheme in which oil and gas drilling must be
permitted in all districts "alters existing expectations of communities
and property owners" by "dispos[ing] of the regulatory structures
upon which citizens and communities made significant financial and
quality of life decisions."" The court returned to this theme in its
subsequent discussion of the statutory setback requirements when it
held that the statewide standards "marginalize[] participation" by
local residents and leaders who typically wield significant influence in
zoning proceedings.7 4
The court based much of its holding on the specific constitutional
premise that the state's duty as trustee of the public natural resources
requires equitable treatment of the corpus of the trust." Somewhat
oddly, the court concluded that prohibiting local governments from
responding to local concerns by enforcing statewide regulations
actually causes a disparate impact on different members of the
public-the trust beneficiaries." By this rationale, the state's
environmental regulations cannot force. some citizens to bear a
"heavier ... burden[]" of the use of resources while granting others a
greater benefit of enjoyment of conservation. Ostensibly, the court
was concerned that in areas where oil and gas drilling will be more
prevalent, the local governments would be unable to intervene to
mitigate the disproportionately dispersed effects. However, to a
certain extent this concern can never be completely mitigated where
gas resources are concentrated in certain parts of the state and not in
others, as in Pennsylvania and in North Carolina. To follow the
court's principle to its furthest extent would significantly limit the
potential production of natural gas in Pennsylvania and other states.
71. Id. at 983.
72. Id. at 979-80.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 984.
75. Id. at 980.
76. Id. at 980-81.
77. Id. at 980.
78. Lower 48 States Shale Plays, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 9, 2011),
http://www.eia.gov/oil-gas/rpd/shale-gas.pdf (regarding Pennsylvania); see supra note 30
and accompanying text (regarding North Carolina).
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Perhaps more importantly, rational, informed property owners
do not expect uniformity in environmental impacts on all property.
Environmental impacts vary dramatically depending on location, one.
reason why property is ultimately valued differently depending on
proximity to drilling locations or other hazards." Allowing an
incidentally disparate impact on the environment because of state
limitations on local control does not infringe on the expectations of
property owners and their surrounding local community, but in some
ways fulfills them.
But the court's discussion of another set of local expectations,
those of property owners in reliance on certain government action,
involves an altogether separate question: whether the state has
preserved governing decisions that are traditionally reserved for
localities.' The court understands that the primary concern is not a
vague sense of inequitable enjoyment of the public resource trust, but
that residents have deeply relied on previous, lawful local decisions
made in exercise of traditionally local governing authority.8' While at
first glance the court may have opened widely a new, powerfully
vague avenue for environmental groups to challenge state regulations
they deem inadequate, it may be that the court has built on a more
predictable theme that relates to its resolution of Huntley & Huntley
and Range Resources-Appalachia: the state will not be allowed to
encroach on functions traditionally reserved for local governments.
Just as a locality cannot exceed its zoning authority to regulate
inconsistent with an existing state scheme, courts in Pennsylvania can
utilize this constitutional provision to prevent the state from altering
the traditional structure of authority to the detriment of localities and
the public trust. The constitutions of other states, including North
Carolina,8 2 contain similar provisions, and it is this balanced
compromise between the roles of local and state governments that is
most advantageously appropriated to other states. States should avoid
overreaching in their desire to limit local control, and in turn, they
can likely avoid the opening of a window for broad challenges to their
environmental regulatory schemes.
79. In many cases, oil and gas drilling decreases property values. See, e.g., Michelle
Conlin, Gas Drilling is Killing Property Values for Some Americans, BUS. INSIDER (Dec.
12, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/drilling-can-make-some-properties-unsellable-
2013-12. Nonetheless, this variance in price reflects and accounts for property owner
expectations.
80. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979-80.
81. Id. at 980.
82. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
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B. Colorado
The experience of Colorado is a useful comparison not for the
results of its still-outstanding legal challenges but as an illustration of
the breadth of political possibilities faced on this contentious issue,
including citizen initiatives to amend the state constitution and
authorize local governments to prohibit hydraulic fracturing. As a
resource-rich state, Colorado faced this issue much sooner than
others and apparently resolved it, at least with regard to a municipal
ban, in a 1992 case in which the state's highest court struck down a
local land use ordinance that effectively prohibited oil and gas
drilling." As in Pennsylvania, the recent controversy surrounding
hydraulic fracturing in Colorado and the surge in municipal activity
has led to renewed uncertainty and discussion of the issues of local
control and preemption.
Colorado, like Pennsylvania, is a form of home rule state in
which municipalities reserve authority over matters of local concern
and, on matters of mixed state and local concern, can act except
where in conflict with state law.' In Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, Inc.,85
the court held that regulation of oil and gas drilling was a mixed
matter of state and local concern, and while the state's oil and gas
statute did not completely occupy the regulatory field to the exclusion
of local action, a ban was in conflict with the clear intent of the state
on the matter." This ruling seemed to leave reasonable room for
localities to regulate certain aspects of oil and gas drilling. However,
the contours of the ruling have not been tested in court, and the
statewide regulatory scheme is thorough, with the Colorado Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") providing for such
matters as well as setback requirements.87 Nonetheless, the explosion
of the hydraulic fracturing debate revived the concerns over state and
local governance in Colorado as it had in Pennsylvania, and several
municipalities have already prohibited hydraulic fracturing, with
others lining up to join them. One commentator speculated that the
83. Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Colo. 1992).
84. See Polley, supra note 41, at 276. This form of local governance is known as
imperium in imperio, Latin for "state within a state." In this system, the critical inquiry is
into the subject matter of the regulation (i.e., oil and gas drilling), determining whether it
is of state or local concern, or both. Id.
85. 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
86. Id. at 1068.
87. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1-604(a)(1) (2013).
88. See Editorial, Regrettable Votes on Colorado Fracking Bans, THE DENVER POST
(Nov. 6, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/editorials/ci_24469438/regiettable-
votes-colorado-hydraulic fracturing-bans.
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change in political climate in Colorado has been so overwhelmingly
toward skepticism of hydraulic fracturing that the state's courts may
be friendlier to home rule of oil and gas drilling than in the past.89
Despite this political development and the previous indication from
the state high court that local governments have room to enforce
some local regulations of oil and gas drilling on matters of local
concern, most of the interest seems to be in enacting bans and
moratoria."
Longmont, one of the towns currently facing a challenge by the
state,91 enacted carefully tailored regulations of oil and gas drilling
under its zoning authority.' These regulations appear designed to
survive a preemption challenge," but the town also amended its
charter to explicitly ban hydraulic fracturing.94 Unlike the approach
taken in Pennsylvania, Longmont did not claim the authority to
prohibit oil and gas drilling in all zoning districts but, rather, claimed
the authority to prohibit a certain technological means of extracting
oil and gas-hydraulic fracturing.95
Longmont thus presents an issue of first impression that was not
addressed in the Pennsylvania litigation: whether a municipality can
ban hydraulic fracturing as a technique while preserving oil and gas
drilling generally." In Pennsylvania, drilling techniques would
assuredly be considered part of the "operations" or "industry" of oil
and gas drilling, so state regulations would preempt a local ban on the
matter.97 Yet perhaps Colorado's unique home rule law provides a
basis for local action in mixed matters of state and local concern, and
this may allow a chance of success for local governments, especially if
the political climate has in fact shifted dramatically.
89. Polley, supra note 41, at 277.
90. See Regrettable Votes on Colorado Fracking Bans, supra note 88.
91. Press Release, Colorado Oil & Gas Ass'n, Colorado Oil & Gas Ass'n's Statement
Regarding Lawsuit. Against Hydraulic Fracturing Bans in Fort Collins and Lafayette,
Colorado Oil & Gas Association (Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter COGA's Statement],
available at http://www.coga.org/PressReleases/PRCOGAStatementRegardingFtCollins
andLafayetteLegalAction.pdf.
92. LONGMONT, COLO., ORDINANCE No. 15.04.020.32 (2012).
93. Joel Minor, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 33
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 106-07 (2013).
94. CITY OF LONGMONT, COLO., CITY CHARTER art. XVI, § 16.3 (2012), available at
http://ourlongmont.org/charter-amendment; Minor, supra note 93, at 105.
95. Minor, supra note 93, at 109-10.
96. Id.atilo.
97. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302 (West 2012); supra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text.
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At the least, the Voss decision may not preclude a ban on a
specific technique, and Longmont's ban may not conflict with
Colorado's statewide regulatory goals. One commentator argues this
position while noting that the COGCC does not specifically and
directly regulate hydraulic fracturing in a manner that would be
"materially impede[d]" by the municipal ban." This is a confusing
statement for several reasons. First, the COGCC imposes both
chemical disclosure requirements and dust control regulations on
hydraulic fracturing." These isolated regulations regarding chemical
disclosure and dust control address environmental impacts that are
unique to hydraulic fracturing, and their existence is likely sufficient
to show that Colorado considers regulation of hydraulic fracturing a
state matter in part, precluding a ban under Voss. Second, although
the COGCC does not have a comprehensive regulatory scheme
dedicated specifically to hydraulic fracturing, it would likely deem
such a scheme unnecessary because hydraulic fracturing is merely a
method of oil and gas drilling, and drilling is obviously extensively
regulated by the COGCC.'" Finally, as ninety-five percent of oil and
gas wells in Colorado are hydraulically fractured,' the state's interest
in hydraulic fracturing is synonymous with its interest in oil and gas
drilling. If the lawsuit proceeds, the resulting analysis and ruling will
be illustrative to municipalities nationally that are contemplating their
options to address hydraulic fracturing; for now, the case remains
only evidence of the myriad experimental local tools.
The most recent development in Colorado is a proposal by
proponents of local control to amend the state constitution to grant
municipalities the ability to regulate or ban oil and gas drilling.102
While the effort is in the early stages and draft language is not yet
available, the stated goals appear to be expansive, hoping to achieve
98. Minor, supra note 93, at 109-10.
99. COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1.205(a), -1.805 (2013).
100. The COGCC is responsible for "[flosterling] the responsible, balanced
development, production. and utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas" in
Colorado and therefore regulates all oil and gas drilling. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-
102(l)(a)(1) (2014). The COGCC has implemented rules specific to hydraulic fracturing.
but they are limited in number and supplemental to existing regulatory
schemes. See COGCC Hydraulic Fracturing Rules, COGCC, http://cogcc.state.co.us/
Announcements/HotTopics/Hydraulic_Fracturing/COGCC%2Hydraulic%20Fracturing
%20Rules.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
101. COGA's Statement, supra note 91.
102. Andrea Rael, Colorado Communities Could Ban Fracking Under New Proposed
Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/01/02/colorado-fracking-amendment-n_4533077.html.
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local regulation of drilling generally, not just hydraulic fracturing.'0 3
An amendment of this sort and the previously discussed ban on
hydraulic fracturing represent additional options for localities in other
states to limit or prohibit hydraulic fracturing and demonstrate the
plethora of possible challenges that a state seeking to promote drilling
may face on an issue dominated by politically charged controversy.
III. LACK OF HOME RULE IN NORTH CAROLINA
This Part examines the North Carolina case law of local
government authorization, which governs whether a local government
is authorized by statute to act in a particular manner, and the case law
of state preemption. As this Part demonstrates, while the case law is
often ambiguous, neither body of law advantages local governments,
casting further doubt on the extent to which they will be able to
regulate hydraulic fracturing after the state implements its regulatory
scheme.
North Carolina, unlike Pennsylvania and Colorado, is one of the
few states in the country that lack any basis for home rule authority-
either constitutional or statutory.'" This is a distinct disadvantage for
North Carolina municipalities relative to those in other states.
However, while states lacking home rule are traditionally
characterized as Dillon's Rule states-that is, states in which local
governing authority is construed strictly and narrowly from specific
state authorizations'os-this characterization may also inaccurately
describe North Carolina law." North Carolina municipalities rely on
specific authorizations in state statutes to act, but the state has
enacted a range of broad authorizations of local governing power,
including broad authority in areas relevant to the hydraulic fracturing
debate, such as regulation of land use and a general police power to
protect the safety, health, and welfare of local communities.0" More
importantly, the state enacted a statute in the 1970s that ostensibly
rejected Dillon's Rule of judicial interpretation of local authority:
"Provisions ... of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants
of power shall be construed to include any additional and
supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to
103. Id.
104. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home Rule?, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1989 (2006).
105. Id. at 1985.
106. Id. at 2011-12.
107. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-381 to 160A-384 (2014).
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carry them into execution and effect."'" This provision, of course, is
limited by a requirement that local action "not be contrary to State or
federal law or to the public policy of this State."'"
The difficulty in characterizing local governing authority in
North Carolina lies in the inconsistency with which courts have
interpreted and applied this statute, occasionally applying a standard
resembling Dillon's Rule, despite the clear legislative mandate to the
contrary." While the precise explanation of this inconsistency
remains elusive,"' the most recent cases suggest that the current
Supreme Court of North Carolina has considered the provision as no
more than a rule of statutory construction, rather than an elastic grant
of local governing authority."2 In the 2012 case of Lanvale Properties,
Inc. v. County of Cabarrus,"I the court limited the provision's
application to cases in which the statute authorizing the specific local
action is ambiguous.1 4 Where the court decides that it can ascertain
the legislature's intent-typically, the intent to occupy a regulatory
field or the intent to limit the range of authorized local actions-there
is no need to apply the rule of construction to unnecessarily expand
local authority."
The court's analysis in Lanvale is relevant to any local regulation
of hydraulic fracturing because it involved a successful challenge to a
county zoning ordinance that encroached on a regulated field and
exceeded the state's statutory authorization." 6 Cabarrus County
enacted an adequate public facilities ordinance ("APFO") that tied
approval of residential land development to the capacity of the
county's public schools."' The court closely scrutinized North
CarQlina's county zoning enabling statutes to determine that the plain
108. Id. § 160A-4.
109. Id.
110. See Bluestein, supra note 104, at 2012-16.
111. It likely has much to do with the composition of the court, which has experienced
turnover through its nonpartisan elections. While early cases interpreting this statute were
decided by courts with known Democratic majorities, the later line of cases demonstrates
the court's subsequent conservative tilt. See David W. Owens, Sustainable Growth:
Evaluating Smart Growth Efforts in the Southeast, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 700
(2000).
112. See, e.g., Lanvale Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 154, 731 S.E.2d
800, 809 (2012) ("The principal flaw in the County's argument is that section 153A-4 is a
rule of statutory construction rather than a general directive to give our general zoning
statutes the broadest construction possible.").
113. 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012).
114. Id. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 169, 731 S.E.2d at 818.
117. Id. at 143, 731 S.E.2d at 803.
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language of those statutes did not grant express or implied authority
to enact the APFO." After reaching this conclusion, the court
refused to apply the broad construction provision and struck down
the ordinance, holding that a rule of broad construction cannot
operate to grant authority that does not fit within the limits set by the
legislature."' Similarly, in the recent case of King v. Town of Chapel
Hill,120 the court applied the broad construction statute when
considering whether a local government's general police power
included the authority to regulate commercial towing activities.121 In
holding that local governments could permissibly require certain
signage and notice to citizens but could not impose a fee schedule, the
court looked for a "rational relationship" between the local
government's action and the purpose of the police power: to protect
health, safety and welfare.12
The refusal to apply the broad construction statute in Lanvale is
a strained interpretation of the statute's language. The language,
which occurs twice in the statute, once in reference to cities and once
in reference to counties, begins with the statement: "It is the policy of
the General Assembly that the cities [and counties] of this State
should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties,
privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law.""' This
hardly reads as only providing a rule of construction in the case of
ambiguous statutes; rather, it seems to provide an intentional
expansion of local governing authority in order to ensure that such
authority, by the "policy" of the state, is "adequate." Nonetheless,
this recent clarification of the broad construction statute in Lanvale,
inconsistently applied in the past, likely will weigh against local
governments seeking new types of authority in the future.
The possibility of state preemption remains an issue even if a
municipality possesses authority for a particular zoning ordinance.
Courts will also strike down a zoning ordinance if it regulates a field
that the state has intentionally sought to occupy. It was on this basis
that the state's highest court invalidated a county zoning ordinance
regulating swine farms.'24 Unlike in Lanvale, the zoning ordinance in
Craig v. County of Chatham' was not held to be per se.invalid for
118. Id. at 155, 731 S.E.2d at 810.
119. Id.
120. _ N.C. _, 758 S.E.2d 364 (2014).
121. Id. at _,758 S.E.2d at 371.
122. Id. at _, 758 S.E.2d at 371.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2014).
124. Craig v. Cnty. of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40,50,565 S.E.2d 172,179 (2002).
125. 356 N.C. 40, 565 S.E.2d 172 (2002).
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lack of enabling authority.16 However, the zoning ordinance
regulated several features of swine farms that were already
specifically regulated by statute, including setback requirements.12 7
The holding was broad, observing that the "General Assembly must
have intended that they comprise a 'complete and integrated
regulatory scheme' on a statewide basis, thus leaving no room for
further local regulation."' 28 The court noted the statute's use of words
such as "coordinated," "cooperative," and "promote" to conclude
that the statute demonstrated a clear intent of the state to occupy the
regulatory field.'29 Likewise, in King, the court invalidated Chapel
Hill's ordinance regulating the use of mobile phones while driving for
similar reasons.'" The court observed that the state had enacted a
statute governing the use of mobile phones and "repeatedly
amended" it to address the same public safety concerns addressed by
Chapel Hill.13' Accordingly, the court held that the state had
demonstrated the intent to create a complete, uniform regulatory
scheme to the exclusion of local regulation.'32
Neither the North Carolina law of home rule nor its lack of law
of preemption advantages local governments, providing little reason
to embolden those seeking to defend local regulation of hydraulic
fracturing when it begins in the state. As these cases illustrate, a local
government must enact regulations within the parameters of a specific
enabling statute, and in most cases it will have to do so without
reliance on broad construction of those parameters. Moreover, if the
state enacts a complete and integrated regulatory scheme governing
hydraulic fracturing, which it is currently pursuing,' localities will
likely be precluded from acting without an explicit, specific grant of
authority.
IV. OIL AND GAS REGULATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
Through its 2014 bill, the Energy Modernization Act,'" the
North Carolina legislature ostensibly sought to avoid any ambiguity in
126. Id. at 54, 565 S.E.2d at 181.
127. Id. at 49-50, 565 S.E.2d at 178-79.
128. Id. at 50, 565 S.E.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 48, 565 S.E.2d at 178.
130. See King v. Town of Chapel Hill, - N.C. , -, 758 S.E.2d 364,374 (2014).
131. Id. at ,758 S.E.2d at 373.
132. Id. at _,758 S.E.2d at 373.
133. Status of Draft Rules, N.C. ENERGY AND MINING COMMISSION,
http://portal.ncdenr.org/web/mining-and-energy-commission/draft-rules (last visited Jan.
10,2015).
134. Energy Modernization Act Ch.4,2014 N.C. Sess. Laws _.
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the preceding analysis, especially regarding preemption."' The bill
expresses the General Assembly's intent to "maintain a uniform
system for the management" of oil and gas drilling, specifically
hydraulic fracturing, as well as its intent to "place limitations" on
regulatory authority "by all units of local government in North
Carolina." 3 6 The bill expressly invalidates any local ordinance that
prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting oil and gas drilling.'
Collectively, this language exceeds that which the Chatham case
requires, as it explicitly preempts local regulation.'38
On the margins of this clear state preemption, two local grants of
power to cities and towns-the police power and zoning authority-
may offer at least some basis for local control, but these grants remain
limited by the Lanvale analysis and by the new hydraulic fracturing
bill. The bill allows local governments to enforce generally applicable
land-use and zoning regulations, specifically including setback
requirements, with the approval of the Mining and Energy
Commission.'39 The delegation of zoning authority to cities and towns
is more concrete and likely the focus of any future legal analysis."4
This grant of power states that cities and towns may use zoning
ordinances for the purpose of promoting health and safety in the local
community, and it lists land use as a proper subject of regulation.14 '
The enabling statute enumerates several permissible purposes for
which localities may use zoning ordinances, and while the statute
implies that the list is not exhaustive, all of the enumerated purposes
address the common theme of efficient land use to address the
problems created in densely populated areas.142
The new hydraulic fracturing law presents a nominal gift to local
governments in North Carolina in that it clearly envisions the use of
zoning ordinances and land-use regulations to regulate oil and gas
drilling, resolving any doubt present under a Lanvale analysis. The
bill "presume[s] to be valid" those regulations that are "generally
135. See § 14 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1 (2014)).
136. § 14(a) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1(a) (2014)).
137. Id.
138. See Craig v. Cnty. of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 50, 565 S.E.2d 172, 179 (2002); supra
notes 124-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of that case.
139. Energy Modernization Act § 14(f) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
415.1(f) (2014)).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (2014).
141. Id.
142. See id. These purposes include regulation of the height and overall size of
buildings and other structures, the size of yards and courts, the percentage of a lot that
may be occupied by a structure, population density, and the location and use of structures
and land. Id.
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applicable to development," but it allows the Mining and Energy
Commission to review and invalidate them based on a limited set of
findings.'43 The Commission can invalidate a local ordinance only if it
finds that: (1) the local ordinance would effectively prohibit hydraulic
fracturing; (2) the operator possesses all required state and federal
permits or approvals and thus is prevented from drilling only by the
local ordinance; (3) local officials and citizens have had the
opportunity to participate in the permitting process; and (4) hydraulic
fracturing will not pose an unreasonable health and environmental
risk to the area, and the operator has made a reasonable effort to
avoid foreseeable risk and comply with local ordinances.'"
Of the four requirements, the first-that ordinances not
effectively prohibit hydraulic fracturing-is exclusively within the
control of local governments. Local governments have an incentive
not to breach this requirement in order to maintain a valid ordinance.
By stopping their regulatory schemes short of an effective ban, they
claim a substantial amount of regulatory authority that is unexposed
to Mining and Energy Commission review. Therefore, these
requirements clarify the reservation of a considerable amount of local
governing power, more so than would have been obvious under a
strict Lanvale analysis prior to the passage of this law.
A final piece of law that bears mentioning is the conservation
provision of the North Carolina Constitution.45 Much like
Pennsylvania's comparable provision (which was critical in the
previously discussed Robinson Township casel'), North Carolina's
provision declares the policy of the state and its political subdivisions
to be the conservation and protection of its land and waters for the
benefit of the citizenry.147 The provision is rarely litigated, and unlike
Pennsylvania's provision that formed the basis for overturning that
state's Oil and Gas Act revisions, North Carolina's does not grant any
express rights to the citizenry or establish a trustee duty for the
government to discharge." 8 However, an overzealous attempt to limit
local discretion in protecting the environment may give credence to
the argument that the state must, as a part of its own policy of
143. Energy Modernization Act § 14(f) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
415.1(f) (2014)).
144. Id.
145. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
146. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
147. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
148. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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protecting the environment, afford a minimal level of authority to
local governments to make sound zoning decisions.
V. LOCAL REGULATION OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NORTH
CAROLINA
North Carolina is in the early stages of learning how to regulate
hydraulic fracturing, and that is most true at the local level, where the
only action taken since the state began the process has been a pair of
bans.149 State law now expressly preempts these bans, but the recent
statute may preserve the authority of local governments to enact a
more limited zoning ordinance.
A. Limited Zoning Ordinances
The form of local hydraulic fracturing regulation most likely to
survive a challenge is a limited zoning ordinance of the sort that was
upheld in the Pennsylvania case Huntley & Huntley,'s though even
this type of ordinance faces an uphill battle in North Carolina. In that
case, Oakmont's ordinance denied oil and gas drilling as a permitted
use in some zoning districts and provided setback requirements.''
The court upheld the ordinance because it regulated aspects of
drilling that were not a part of oil and gas drilling "operations," the
subject of the state's regulations, and because the town regulated
these aspects, at least in part, for the local purpose of promoting
efficient land use, as opposed to the state purpose of protecting the
environment.'52 But, unlike Pennsylvania, North Carolina is not a
home rule state, and its municipalities do not possess an inherent
authority to enact zoning ordinances.153 However, North Carolina has
specifically enabled zoning ordinances for purposes that resemble
those upheld in Pennsylvania, particularly efficient use of land.15 4
Moreover, the new hydraulic fracturing law specifically envisions.this
type of regulation of oil and gas drilling,' providing a legal basis for
towns to restrict drilling to certain zoning districts and to impose
setback requirements.
149. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
150. 964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
151. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 864.
152. Id. at 864-65.
153. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (2014).
155. Energy Modernization Act, ch. 4, § 14(f), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws _, (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1 (2014)).
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A setback requirement is likely uncontroversial due to its express
mention in the law.' 6 The case of a local government attempting to
exclude hydraulic fracturing from certain zoning districts, and
essentially corner it into others, would be more difficult for two
reasons. First, some questions would arise as to whether this
application of a zoning ordinance is truly "general," as required by
the law.'s Second, this is perhaps as close as a local government could
come to an effective ban. Recall that in Oakmont, Pennsylvania, the
local government restricted drilling to certain districts,' apparently
to discourage drilling generally in the town. In North Carolina,
whether the local ordinance constituted an effective ban-and thus
triggered the possibility of invalidation by the Mining and Energy
Commission-would depend on the scope of the ordinance, the
feasibility of compliance, and the remaining viability of oil and gas
drilling in the locality.
B. Effective Bans
North Carolina's most recent legislative act expressly prohibits
effective bans.'59 Even the favored tactic of Longmont, Colorado is
also almost assuredly illegal in North Carolina. Longmont used its
home rule authority to prohibit hydraulic fracturing as a drilling
technique, while refraining from a futile attempt to prohibit oil and
gas drilling generally.'" A similar tactic lacks the necessary
foundation in North Carolina law. Colorado grants municipalities
local authority over matters of local concern; oil and gas drilling is
considered a mixed matter of state and local concern.'6 1 On such
matters, local governments can act in areas in which the state has
chosen not to, provided the act is consistent with the regulatory
scheme.'62 Local governments in North Carolina lack this power, and
there is no grant of power for local governments to regulate hydraulic
fracturing generally. 6 1 Moreover, unlike Colorado, the North
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 857 (Pa.
2009).
159. Energy Modernization Act, § 14(a).
160. CITY OF LONGMONT, COLO. CITY CHARTER art. XVI, § 16.3 (2012), available at
http://ourlongmont.org/charter-amendment; Minor, supra note 93, at 105.
161. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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Carolina legislature has declared its specific intent to promote
hydraulic fracturing, not merely oil and gas drilling generally.'6
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
As the compromise reached by Pennsylvania courts illustrates,
there is no need to trample the traditional zoning authority of local
governments in order to accomplish the North Carolina General
Assembly's policy of promoting hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic
fracturing, of course, affects a range of issues that are within this
realm of needs to which local government expertly responds, such as
urban development and land use. These issues, which do not touch
the larger questions of energy public policy, should rightly remain
within the purview of local governments. Local governments should
possess the same authority to regulate the location of oil and gas
drilling as they do other industrial and commercial activity-not to
regulate for the purposes of environmental protection but for the
purpose of efficient, effective land use and community welfare.
Currently, local governments in North Carolina face a great deal
of uncertainty regarding the extent to which they possess this
authority due to: the lack of home rule; vague zoning enabling
statutes; the inconsistent standard of judicial review of local authority
under those statutes; and, most recently, the future prospect of
Mining and Energy Commission review. One author has made
compelling suggestions for reforming North Carolina's law of home
rule generally.'6 6 More specifically regarding the issue of hydraulic
fracturing, the legislature has provided the framework to allow a
compromise similar to Pennsylvania by preserving traditional local
ordinance authority.167 The new law specifically allows setback
requirements and zoning restrictions, subject to approval by the
Mining and Energy Commission.16 1 Whether the law in North
Carolina embraces this balance in practice will depend on how the
Mining and Energy Commission exercises its role within this
framework provided by the legislature.
164. Clean Energy and Economic Security Act, ch. 143, § 1(b), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws
658, 658-60 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-293.1 (2014)).
165. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
166. See Bluestein, supra note 104, at 2023-28.
167. See Energy Modernization Act, ch. 4, § 14, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws _, (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1 (2014)).
168. Id.
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CONCLUSION
North Carolina's 2014 Energy Modernization Act largely
resolves the question of to what extent local governments can
regulate hydraulic fracturing. It leaves most authority to the state,
expressly preempting most local attempts to restrict the practice.'6 1
However, it preserves a limited authority for local governments to
enforce generally applicable ordinances.7 0 In implementing this
provision, the Mining and Energy Commission should follow the
compromise model presented by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
resolving similar questions in that state.'7' By this model,
municipalities reserve authority to act in ways that serve traditionally
local governing functions, such as organizing land use and
development, but cannot contravene the energy policy of the state by
effectively prohibiting or discouraging authorized activity."' If
successful, the legislature will have transitioned the state into
hydraulic fracturing in a manner that allows for regulation addressing
safety and health concerns while avoiding costly uncertainty and
litigation.
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